May 3, 2006

Wind energy promoters take advantage of state-issued Non-Veracity Licenses

On energy giant Gruppo UPC's Sheffield Wind site, the following statements are made: "More people turned out for the non-binding referendum in support of UPC’s project in Sheffield than voted in the last presidential election. A strong majority [sic] voted in favor of the project (120-93). An opinion poll conducted after the election showed that people favored the project because it provided clean, renewable energy and a positive economic impact for the town."

Notice the trickiness of that last sentence. It does not say that the poll corroborated the vote but only describes the reasons given for those who "favored" the project.

In fact, the question was whether one would like to see none, less, the same, or more wind development in Sheffield. It was part of a general survey along with other items such as agriculture and cell towers and the reasons one chooses to live in the town (or township, as it would be called in other places). In contrast to UPC's statement, it did not specify the project. The level of wind development in Sheffield is currently none, so UPC's agents campaigned vigorously to make sure people understood that support of their project required a "more" vote.

Nevertheless, the result was that only 40% (69 of 173) wanted to to see wind development. Forty-five percent (78 of 173) clearly chose "none," and the rest chose "less" (8) or "the same" (18), which meant in effect "none." Hence the slipperiness of the statement on the UPC web site. And even that is dishonest, because the survey gave no indication of the reasons people made their choices. UPC's spin is simple projection of their, well, their own spin.

That 2-1 rejection of industrial-scale wind power corroborated a survey the year before in which 79% of the residents and property owners -- 346 out of 436 -- signed a petition from Ridge Protectors against UPC's project.

The vote of 120-93 (56%-44%, hardly a "strong" majority) was clearly the aberration, and it followed a "grass roots" organizing campaign run by a Burlington advertising firm hired by UPC and apparent outright vote buying. The developer's tactics clearly served as a wake-up call, and the vote was corrected in the subsequent poll.

Another example on the web site of the developer's deceit is hidden in their output projections. By calculating back, one can determine that they are based on a capacity factor of 32%, even though the actual experience in the U.S., including Vermont, is less than four-fifths of that, around 25%.

As a correspondent from Malone, N.Y., has quipped, wind power promoters carry a Non-Veracity License (NVL) stamped for a nominal fee by the secretary of state. That's why they're taken seriously. The law requires that they not be questioned.

wind power, wind energy, wind farms, Vermont, anarchism, anarchosyndicalism, ecoanarchism

April 30, 2006

What are green tags?

Green tags were invented by Enron to be able to sell wind energy twice. First the actual energy is sold, then the packaging. The purchaser of green tags is buying an empty box.

And wind power investors are laughing all the way to their offshore bank accounts (letting drop a few pieces of their folding money to keep the locals happy so they can wave it, along with the jumbo-jet-sized turbine blades, in the face of the newcomers).

Not surprisingly, there turns out to be greater demand for the box -- it is certainly more reliable and a lot prettier -- than for the energy itself.

And for those who must meet renewable energy obligations or portfolio standards, they can hide their pollution in the "green" box, and that's good enough for the government and even for many groups that call themselves environmentalist!

wind power, wind energy, environment, environmentalism, anarchism, anarchosyndicalism, ecoanarchism

April 28, 2006

The Maple Ridge Wind Farm "lease"

Here are some features from the lease that the Flat Rock Wind Power company draws up for owners of the land where it wants to erect giant wind turbines. The Maple Ridge facility on the Tug Hill plateau in Lewis County, N.Y., near Lowville, currently boasts 120 390-ft-high turbines and at least 75 more, possibly larger models, are planned. The lease is for 25 years with the option then of the lessee (the wind company) to extend it another 15.
3.3: Right to replace turbines with newer (larger) models, even at new locations as approved by lessor, who shall not "unreasonably" withhold, condition, or delay consent. Operations and improvements may be performed by sublessee or subcontractors of sublessee (making it all the more difficult to remedy violations).

4.1.1: Easement to allow "audio, visual, view, light, noise, vibration, air turbulence, wake, shadow flicker, electromagnetic, television reception, ice or other weather created hazards or other effect of any kind whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly" from the project and the leased property. [emphasis added] 5.10: Same for any improvements.

4.1.5: Seventy-five-feet-wide easement for transmission and communication lines.

4.2: Right to use access, utility, water, "or other easements, rights of way or licenses over lands in the general vicinity" of the leased property.

5.1.2: Right to change turbine and road locations up to 50 feet and underground transmission lines by 250 feet -- more by request, to which lessor must respond in 5 days or consent is assumed. If lessor has reasons for denying change, lessee is not required to address concerns if it would increase costs or decrease capture of wind.

20.1: Right to transfer ownership of project without lessor's approval.

34: "[L]evel of power production, the wind capacity of the property and the availability of the wind power facilities" and the lease itself must remain confidential.

37: Lessor or relative forbidden to interfere with flow of air over leased property by, e.g., planting trees or constructing buildings.

40: Requirement of lessor to waive all applicable setback laws and ordinances between leased and remaining part of property.
Many defenders of those who sign their land up for these facilities invoke "property rights" to justify their disregard for the concerns of neighbors. Other than the bald fact that it is not the landowner who writes the lease and essentially becomes a caretaker on his or her own property for 25 to 40 years, all of the above items, especially those from paragraphs 4.1.1, 37, and 40, make a mockery of the owner's property rights.

Another lease, with similar features, has been described previously. The Flat Rock company is also getting neighboring property owners to sign agreements, as excerpted here. The consequence of believing the wind company that there will be no reason to complain, because any problems you hear about are just dreamed up by newcomer NIMBYs trying to protect their views, and thus not questioning why then the wind company wants you to sign away your right to complain (see item 4.1.1 above), has been described here, too.

wind power, wind energy, wind farms, anarchism

April 26, 2006

Greens Tags

[press release]

Washington -- A coalition of giant supermarket chains and token small grocers, along with a nutritionist from a supermarkets-funded program at an otherwise little known academic institution, hailed the bipartisan agreement today by the state's legislature and governor to establish the marketing of grocers greens tags.

"A lot of overpaid lobbyists have billed for a lot of hours to make this bill a reality," a spokesman for one supermarket chain is imagined to have said. "It is crucial to our efforts to improve the diets of Americans."

Background

In the past, the effort to introduce leafy greens into diets has been stymied by the extra expense of a product that shrinks substantially when cooked, thus requiring so much more to supply a satisfying meal. A cycle of reluctance to buy enough and consequent disappointment with the shrunken result prevented the movement of greens from grocers' shelves at an adequate rate to remain profitable.

That all changed in the mid-1990s when Enron expanded into the wholesale grocery business. The company's "whiz-kid" accountants perceived that there were two parts in the cost of leafy greens. As food, their cost was comparable to other, more popular, items. The extra cost was for the nutritional attributes. Enron convinced the state of California to require grocers to sell a certain percentage of "healthy" foods, particularly leafy greens which could be quickly grown.

The "greens obligations" were calculated from the purchase of the extra-cost nutritional attributes, as represented by "grocers greens tags," accounted separately from the regular food part of the greens. Grocers greens tags are "grown" at the same time as the food itself, and thus the grocer could buy the greens both as food and as a benefit to the diet.

But what if a grocer's wholesaler did not have enough greens to sell? Since some grocers had more than enough greens to meet their greens obligations, they were allowed to sell, or to allow their wholesaler to sell, the excess greens tags to others. This very effectively promoted the growth of greens by creating a profitable market for their nutritional attributes apart from their value as food. This market also allowed grocers to meet their greens obligations, if not to their own customers then by helping to defray the costs of better nutrition for the customers of other grocers.

Today

The use of grocers greens tags is now commonplace, with brokers springing up across the country and many companies buying them for their cafeterias and vending machines. Even individuals can buy them to "offset" their bad diets. Today's announcement brings the total number of states that have established a greens tags system for a healthier America to 17.

"We can all eat better, even if we don't," an executive of one of the coalition's grocery chains is said to have said.

"It's the market at work -- everyone wins," an analyst from a bloated Wall Street investment company that happens to have substantial investments in the giant grocery business added. "With grocers greens tags, combined with greens obligations standards, venture capitalists are very excited by the lower risk and much larger returns."

The coalition also recognized the untiring efforts of many public interest groups such as Greens Pease International and the state's Public Interest Group.

A statement from Greens Pease in praise of the new bill echoed the business interests: "We can have our greens and eat them, too -- or not and say we did."

wind power, wind energy, environment, environmentalism, anarchism, anarchosyndicalism

April 25, 2006

Why a 52-MW wind "farm" is worth only 4.3 MW

I have been asked to clarify the numbers from the "data" paragraph of the previous post, "Why is VPIRG hiding?".

Capacity factor: Searsburg started at about 24% and has now been around 21% for a few years. The national average as reported by facilities themselves to the Energy Information Agency of the DOE is 27%, but they apparently do not count out-of-commission turbines, so I think 25% is a fair estimate. Note that in the U.K., with the "best" wind resource in Europe, the capacity factor also is only 24% or so.

That's the easy one.

For most of the power curve between the cut-in wind speed of 9 mph and the rated wind speed of 30 mph, the power generation increases cubically in relation to the wind speed. That is, as the wind speed doubles, the power output increases eightfold.

Say the wind speeds are evenly distributed within that range, that is, it blows at 12 mph as often as at 24 mph and so on across the range. Because the turbine produces power at much lower rates at slow than at high wind speeds (one-eighth the power, e.g., at 12 mph than at 24 mph), such an even distribution of wind speeds would mean that the turbine is producing at lower rates much more often.

All this is to explain actual observations as shown in this graphic from German grid manager Eon Netz. The curve follows the total output (or infeed to the grid) of Eon Netz's wind plant and the number of hours that level was reached or surpassed. For example, the infeed was at least 2,000 MW during approximately 5,000 quarter-hours of the year and 1,000 MW during about 12,500 quarter-hours. Higher levels of infeed were seen during much fewer quarter-hours.


The heavy horizontal line shows the average infeed (which, as a percentage of the total installed capacity, represents the capacity factor, in this case 16.4%). That level was seen during about 12,500 quarter-hours, which is 35% of the year. The graph shows, therefore, that the average rate of production is seen only a third of the time. That is, only one third of the time the turbines produce at or above their average rate.

A higher capacity factor would simply raise straighten the curve somewhat; the average infeed, although higher, would still be seen only a third of the time.


This graph, from a Views of Scotland paper, shows the same thing even more clearly. Each bar shows how many hours of the year the infeed was in the specified range. The total heights of the first three columns represent two-thirds of the year but only one-fourth of the installed capacity. The capacity factor in Denmark is actually around 20% or less, so a rate of production at or above average was reached less than a third of the time.

That's the time the wind plant is reasonably productive. But that is not really how I got down to 4.3% effective capacity for UPC's proposed 52-MW facility in Sheffield and Sutton.

The "effective" capacity is a measure of how much other sources could be replaced by wind power for the supply system to remain reliable. It is also called "capacity credit." It is a much more speculative number, but study after study of the grid integration of intermittent, nondispatchable, and imprecisely predictable wind energy put it at about a third of the capacity factor.

The scenario is that even as, say, a 52-MW wind plant produces at an average of 13 MW, the grid cannot decommission or plan not to install a corresponding 13 MW but perhaps only a third of that. As more wind plant is added and therefore more often uses more of the rest of the system to balance it, that "credit" approaches zero (which the Irish Grid study I alluded to clearly states).

I'm a bit out of my depth here, but I would assume the capacity credit would be reflected in costs to utilities, which would be similarly unable to contract for less energy to an amount that is anywhere near the amount of wind power they may purchase. Thus, if Washington Electric buys UPC's production from 52 MW of turbines averaging 13 MW, it would be able to buy only 4.3 MW less from other sources.

wind power, wind energy, wind farms, Vermont, environment, environmentalism

April 22, 2006

Why is VPIRG hiding?

It is no secret that VPIRG supports industrial-scale wind power development of Vermont's ridgelines. It has been at the forefront of arguing on behalf of the developers, even as it fights such heedless sprawl in every other issue they are involved in.

After the recommendation from the Public Service Board hearing officer to deny a permit to the four-turbine project in East Haven, the next project they are advocating for is a 26-turbine (each 399 feet high) development in Sheffield and Sutton. But the "group" sent out to rally the people in the developer's favor is called "Clean Power Vermont."

I looked up the group's internet domain (cleanpowervt.org) information some time ago and discovered that it was registered by VPIRG. The main organizer, Tyler Edgar, is an employee of VPIRG. (She was also the sole representative of an earlier group, "Clean Air Vermont," which held an "informational" meeting in Sutton before that town rejected the project by a margin of 6 to 1.) Joining her for the Sheffield push is Drew Hudson, field director of VPIRG. The domain information is now hidden, but the the web pages are still filled (at the time of this writing) with code referring to vpirg.org.

Although they may have been defeated in East Haven, VPIRG board members Dave Rapaport and Mathew Rubin (the developers) are now targeting the string of ridges between East Haven and Island Pond (town of Brighton) that overlook the protected "Champion" lands and the Nulhegan Basin, which has been recognized by National Geographic as one of the world's prime "geotourism" destinations. Obviously VPIRG/EMDC (Rubin & Rapaport's company) needs a favorable precedent to improve their chances of a permit and thus their fanatical -- and dishonest -- promotion of the Sheffield/Sutton installations.

Data: Italy-based UPC has applied to erect 26 two-megawatt (MW) turbines (Gamesa G87 models), each 399 feet high (requiring strobe lights day and night), their rotor blades each sweeping a vertical air space of 1.47 acres. The average output from this 52-MW facility can be expected to be only 25% of its rated capacity, or 13 MW. Because of the cubic relation of output to wind speed below the ideal of 30 mph, however, it would generate at or above that rate only a third of the time, as shown by infeed curves from Germany and Ireland. Its effective capacity, its actual contribution to grid capacity planning, would be about a third of that, or 4.3 MW, since it is nondispatchable, variable, and imprecisely predictable. (This figure of the effective capacity, or capacity credit, of large-scale wind power on the grid is taken from studies by New York, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Germany, all of them supportive of wind power development; the Irish and German studies also noticed that as more wind power is added to the system, presumably as its penetration approaches the excess capacity that can readily serve to balance its fluctuating infeed, the capacity credit of new turbines approaches zero.)

At 4.3 MW effective capacity, the output from the Sheffield/Sutton plant would represent about two-thirds of one percent of Vermont's current electricity needs. Clearly the negative impacts of such a massive and prominently intrusive facility far outweigh this meager possible benefit.

wind power, wind energy, wind farms, wind turbines, Vermont, environment, environmentalism, ecoanarchism